Fatwah mandating the bloodshed of israelis everywhere
Yousry read the messages to Abdel Rahman during the visit, and Abdel Rahman dictated to Yousry responses to some of them. Stewart and Yousry also contend that Count Four, alleging a conspiracy to violate section 2339A, acts impermissibly as a charge of a “multi-level inchoate offense,” a “logical absurdity” that “violate [s] due process.” Stewart Br. The gist of their argument is that the charge effectively criminalizes a “conspiracy to conspire,” thereby violating due process by extending criminal liability to a degree too remote from any substantive criminal offense to pass constitutional muster. As what seems to us to be a variation on the same theme, Stewart and Yousry assert that the district court erred by “impermissibly dilut[ing]” the proof required for conviction of the Count-Two conspiracy in the context of the material support convictions under section 2339A. Instead, both were charged with and convicted of violating section 2339A, and, as discussed, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction on those charges. § 1001, which subjects to criminal sanctionswhoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully-(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry․18 U. On May 7, 2001, Stewart signed a revised affirmation to the same effect and telecopied it to the same office. There, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction of the defendant under 18 U. But central to the Williams Court's analysis was the proposition that a check, even a bad check, “is not a factual assertion at all.” Id. Stewart argues that she was selectively prosecuted on account of her gender and political beliefs, and both Stewart and Sattar assert that the government's decision to file a superseding indictment following their successful efforts to dismiss several counts of the initial indictment constitutes vindictive prosecution.
C., New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Lynne Stewart. Defendants Lynne Stewart, Mohammed Yousry, and Ahmed Abdel Sattar appeal from judgments of conviction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (John G. We affirm the district court's rejection of Sattar's vindictive prosecution claim because there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the government's pre-trial decision to add new charges against Sattar amounted to an effort to punish him for exercising his constitutional rights. This is ․ enough proof that the Egyptian regime does not have the intention to interact with this peaceful Initiative [i.e., the cease-fire] which aims at unification. § 2339B is unconstitutionally vague ․ with regard to the statute's prohibition on providing material support or resources in the form of communications equipment and personnel.” Sattar I, 272 F. The district court agreed, and therefore dismissed those charges. Indeed Sattar, the only defendant charged with and convicted of participating in the Count-Two conspiracy, does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to this count. It also offered proof that this fatwa was communicated to Atia, an al-Gama'a military leader. We agree, however, with the district court's conclusion that “[t]he meaning of ‘personnel’ is clear in the context of § 2339A when applied to personnel who are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, specific crimes.” Sattar III, 314 F. Similar scienter requirements have saved other statutes from void-for-vagueness challenges.
Following his conviction and appeal therefrom, Abdel Rahman's legal team focused on two goals: improving his conditions of confinement, and obtaining his transfer from prison in the United States to Egypt. 8, 1997), was redesignated an FTO in 19, see Notices, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 64 Fed. Rifa'i Taha Musa (“Taha”)-a military leader of al-Gama'a, a follower of Abdel Rahman, and an unindicted co-conspirator herein-was involved in the incident. We review a district court's decision denying discovery on claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness for abuse of discretion. Sattar provides no reason for us to deviate from this general rule here, and no basis upon which we can conclude that the district court's findings in this respect were clearly erroneous. Despite the length of the instructions, we presume, as did the district court, see Sattar V, 395 F. at 104, that the jurors followed them, see, e.g., Richardson v.
8, 1999); Notices, Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 66 Fed. In November 1997, despite the cease-fire, a group associated with al-Gama'a attacked, killed, and mutilated the bodies of more than sixty tourists, guides, and guards at the Hatshepsut Temple in Luxor, Egypt. Nonetheless, “a prosecution brought with vindictive motive, penalizing those who choose to exercise constitutional rights, would be patently unconstitutional.” Id. We will dismiss an indictment if actual vindictiveness has been demonstrated, or if, under the circumstances, “there is a presumption of vindictiveness that has not been rebutted by objective evidence justifying the prosecutor's action.” Id. We review a district court's factual findings on prosecutorial vindictiveness for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo. Johnson, 171 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam). Ed.2d 74 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sanders, 211 F.3d at 717 (same).
Moreover, we reject both Stewart's argument that, as a lawyer, she was not bound by the SAMs, and her belated argument collaterally attacking their constitutionality. § 956, and his conviction of soliciting persons to commit crimes of violence-viz., murder and conspiracy to commit murder-in violation of 18 U. We therefore affirm the convictions in their entirety. We conclude that the district court committed neither procedural error in calculating the applicable Guidelines ranges, nor substantive error in varying from those ranges pursuant to its consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U. Because the district court declined to find whether Stewart committed perjury at trial, we cannot conclude that the mitigating factors found to support her sentence can reasonably bear the weight assigned to them. They brought with them another letter which included another message from Taha, again asking for Abdel Rahman's support for ending the cease-fire. We have no basis upon which to entertain a doubt as to the authority of the Attorney General of the United States to ensure that reasonable measures are designed and implemented in an attempt to prevent imprisoned criminals who are considered dangerous despite their incarceration from engaging in or facilitating further acts of criminality from their prison cells. He has demonstrated his willingness to engage in violent criminality not by acting violently himself, but by ordering, encouraging, and conspiring with others who would actually shed the blood. Resolution of this dispute does not turn on whether the prosecution introduced evidence of “pure speech.” “Numerous crimes under the federal criminal code are, or can be, committed by speech alone,” and certain crimes “are characteristically committed through speech.” Rahman, 189 F.3d at 117. For example, in reaffirming that he was withdrawing his support for the cease-fire, Abdel Rahman said that he had “expressed [his] opinion and left the matters to [his] brothers to examine it and study it.” Statement for Release, Abdel Rahman, June 20, 2000.
We affirm as to Sattar's conviction of conspiring to murder persons in a foreign country in violation of 18 U. This is so particularly in light of the seriousness of her criminal conduct, her responsibilities as a member of the bar, and her role as counsel for Abdel Rahman. But Jabara would not permit Abdel Rahman to dictate a letter to Yousry in response. The likelihood that he would continue to order, direct, or encourage such acts from prison, if he could, was plain, and his incapacitation reasonably required not just his physical immobility, but also his virtual silence visà-vis the world at large. The issue is, instead, whether Abdel Rahman's statements were protected speech. But a reasonable jury could have found, in light of Abdel Rahman's role as “spiritual” leader of al-Gama'a, that his messages were ultimately intended to sway al-Gama'a members to end the cease-fire, and by implication to commit criminal acts of violence.